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Understanding the role of Tier-I suppliers in enabling sustainable 
practices across multi-tier supply chains 
 
Abstract 
This study aims to identify the conditions in which Tier-I suppliers will implement lead firms’ 
sustainability requirements across multi-tier supply chains. It aims to build on existing 
literature by examining the role of Tier-I supplier from agency and institutional theory 
perspectives. In addition, it also identifies whether selective disclosure can exist when Tier-I 
suppliers couple with their double agency role. Taking a case study approach, we focus on 
agri-food commodities such as soybeans, palm oil and cocoa which have strong sustainability 
implications. Data were collected from several sources and case analyses were conducted. 
Results are encouraging for managers and policymakers.  
Keywords: Sustainability, Supply Chain, Agency Theory, Institutional Theory 
 











External stakeholders are often unable to differentiate between buying firms and their 
suppliers’ behaviours. They tend to hold buying firms responsible for all the production and 
manufacturing activities in their supply chain, creating a chain liability effect (Rao, 2002; 
Choi & Linton, 2011; Hartmann & Moeller, 2014)). When companies fail to monitor their 
supply chain, they may face reputational damages, financial penalties and consumer boycotts. 
Lead firms that seek to address and mitigate against this chain liability effect need to create a 
transparent supply chain. The ideal solution is for lead firms to monitor all their suppliers. 
However, this can be challenging due to location, lack of collaborative technologies, or the 
sheer number of suppliers. When buying firms’ supply chains are spread across the globe, it 
becomes challenging to implement sustainability policies across different cultures and local 
practices. Further, lead firms’ lack of knowledge about their sub-suppliers is also another 
challenge relating to supplier management (Choi & Hong, 2002; Choi & Linton, 2011). As 
buying firms have limited control over sub-suppliers in a multi-tier supply chain, the 
responsibilities of managing sub-suppliers can fall on Tier-I suppliers. This is known as an 
‘indirect’ approach to managing sub-suppliers (Tachizawa & Wong, 2014).  
In a multi-tier supply chain, Tier-I suppliers may have to take on the responsibility of 
implementing lead firms’ sustainability requirements in their own operations and disseminate 
lead firms’ sustainability standards to their suppliers. This is known as the double agency 
theory (Wilhelm et al., 2016). As Tier-I suppliers may operate in different environments from 
the lead firm, they may face different trade-offs when it comes to implementing sustainability 
standards on behalf of buying firms. This leads to different outcomes such as Tier-I suppliers 
engaging in symbolic compliance with the lead firm’s requirements, or fully complying with 
their sustainability requirements.  
There are two forms of symbolic compliance strategies, decoupling and attention deflection 
(Marquis & Toffel, 2012). Decoupling involves suppliers creating an image which makes it 
seem like they are complying with the lead firm’s requirements without actively doing so 
(Marquis & Toffel, 2012). Attention deflection, in particular, selective disclosure, refers to 
companies that disclose positive information about their compliance with external demands 
but choose to hide negative information that may harm their business (Egels-Zanden, et al., 
2015; Marquis et al., 2016). If Tier-I suppliers choose to engage in symbolic compliance and 
are exposed by stakeholders, this can have a negative impact on the lead firm due to the chain 
liability effect.   
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This study builds on existing literature (Wilhelm et al., 2016) to identify the conditions in 
which Tier-I suppliers will implement lead firms’ sustainability standards in their operations 
and those of their suppliers. We will examine this from agency and institutional theory 
perspectives to understand the conditions in which Tier-I suppliers will couple with the 
double-agency role in the agri-food industry. We also incorporate selective disclosure, as 
firms may conceal negative information about their sustainable practices despite coupling 
with their double agency role. The paper assumes a multi-tier supply chain as three tiers 
rather than networks and linkages with different actors (Wilhelm, et al., 2016). This allows us 
to gain a deeper understanding of the double agency role within different institutional 
contexts. Taking a multi-case study approach, we collected data and conducted within- and 
between-case analyses.   
We first review relevant literature and set out our theoretical framework, before outlining our 
methodology in section 3. Section 4 presents the results of our case study analyses, and 
section 5 presents a discussion and implications of our findings. The paper is concluded in 
section 6. 
2. Literature Review 
With increasing pressure on buying firms to implement sustainability at lower levels, Tier-I 
suppliers act as important agents in disseminating sustainability standards to lower tier 
suppliers (Andersen & Skjoett‐Larsen, 2009; Beske et al., 2008). As Tier-I suppliers may 
make buying or manufacturing decisions on behalf of the lead firm, they can influence the 
entire supply chain’s sustainability. Their position can be described as a double agency role 
(Wilhelm, et al., 2016). The primary agency role refers to Tier-I suppliers fulfilling lead firms’ 
sustainability requirements, while the secondary agency role reflects Tier-I suppliers 
implementing lead firms’ requirements in Tier-II suppliers’ operations (Wilhelm, et al., 2016). 
Within a multi-tier supply chain there are multiple stakeholders, which raises the importance 
of agency theory. This theory refers the problems that occur when the principal delegates 
work to the agent. Agents are driven by self-interest and may engage in opportunistic 
behaviours and create high risks for principles when there is high information asymmetry and 
conflicting goals between the two parties (Eisenhardt, 1988; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003). When 
there is goal conflict and information asymmetry between the lead firm and Tier-I suppliers, 
this can lead to the suppliers engaging in opportunistic behaviours.  
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Agency theory is widely used in supply chain management, as shown in a comprehensive 
literature review by Fayezi et al. (2012). One study suggests using direct suppliers in 
managing sub-suppliers. However, this study did not elaborate on the conditions that direct 
suppliers will take on the role of implementing sustainability in their suppliers’ operations 
(Wiese & Toporowski, 2013). Tachizawa and Wong (2014) identified several contingencies 
and how those contingencies can affect firms’ approaches to managing sustainability within 
multi-tier supply chains. They briefly mentioned the possibility of delegating the 
responsibilities of managing sub-suppliers to Tier-I suppliers. They also highlighted the role 
of agency factors, but the study is conducted from a lead firm’s perspective. In addition, it 
does not delve into the conditions that affect Tier-I suppliers in implementing sustainability 
in their own operations and in their suppliers’ operations. We focus on information 
asymmetry and incentives as multi-tier supply chains tend to have several agents with 
different incentives.  
Institutional Factors  
In a multi-tier supply chain, Tier-I suppliers experience pressure from regulations, lead firm 
(Tachizawa & Wong, 2014) and industry pressures (Simpson, et al., 2012). These factors can 
affect how Tier-I suppliers convey sustainability upstream in their supply chain. Although 
organisations seek to satisfy institutional stakeholders’ demand and gain legitimacy, they are 
confined by local circumstances and access to resources to implement sustainability (Bhakoo 
& Choi, 2013). When they implement policies or procedures to gain legitimacy, this can 
make them less efficient and reduce their competitiveness. Due to this, they may engage in 
symbolic compliance to meet institutional demand.  
Wilhelm et al. (2016) concluded that agency and institutional theories are important in the 
multi-tier supply chain for multinational companies. They explored the conditions in which 
Tier-I suppliers are willing to take on the double agency role in multi-tier supply chains from 
agency and institutional perspectives. This study explores the effect of incentives and 
information transparency on Tier I suppliers’ willingness to comply or refuse to implement 
sustainability standards in both their own operations and those of their suppliers. Their study 
found that both factors have a positive effect on coupling with double agency role. However, 
this study can further be improved by applying agency and institutional factors to agriculture 
commodities with high sustainability issues like palm oil and cocoa (Newton et al., 2013). In 
addition, the application of selective disclosure can also improve the study due to the 
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existence of the chain liability effect. Selective disclosure is a type of symbolic compliance, 
which refers to the action of promoting positive information and hiding negative information 
(Marquis & Toffel, 2012). Although the Tier-I suppliers might seem to comply with the lead 
firms’ sustainability requirements by promoting their sustainability standards, they might 
intentionally conceal negative information to appear compliant with stakeholder pressure and 
create a positive image. However, if external stakeholders expose the negative information, 
this can lead to significant damage to a firm’s reputation (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011). In 
addition, this reputational damage can also affect lead firms, even if they are not directly 
involved in the concealment of their suppliers’ negative information.  
This discussion raises two questions: 
•    Firstly, what conditions affect Tier-I agri-food suppliers to couple or decouple with their 
double agency role relating to sustainability? 
•    Secondly, can selective disclosure still exist when Tier-I suppliers display signs of 
coupling with their double agency role?  
 
3. Research Methodology 
We adopted a case study methodology and followed the steps proposed by Eisenhardt (1989). 
For case selection, we selected food companies that have high visibility (Castka & Balzarova, 
2008; Wu & Pagell, 2011; Simpson et al. 2012; Wilhelm et al., 2016). We selected soy, cocoa 
and palm oil, which are agri-food commodities that have high sustainability impacts (Newton 
et al., 2013). Suitable firms were selected by referring to sustainability indexes and NGO 
websites. This allowed us to identify firms that use those specific commodities in their supply 
chains and are active in promoting sustainability in their respective supply chains due to 
chain liability effects. We focused on firms with an annual turnover of over 5 billion euros. 
They are based in Europe or North America. We shortlisted 12 companies from which we 
selected five for case analysis based on the information they supplied about their 
sustainability efforts in the supply chain. 
3.1. Data Collection 
We examined buying firms’ reports and websites to select appropriate Tier-I suppliers. For 
each supply chain, we identified one main supplier either based on the lead firm’s spend or its 
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acknowledgement of the supplier being critical to the company’s operations. We primarily 
collected data from three sources. First, we analysed lead firm and suppliers’ corporate 
materials, websites and existing case studies, and consulted data sources from external 
sources, to aid with triangulation purposes (Jick, 1979). Second, we reviewed publications of 
external stakeholders such as NGO online materials or documents. As Tier-I suppliers are 
less likely to reveal negative information on their websites and publications, this helped us to 
identify if Tier-I suppliers were engaging in selective disclosure. Finally, we used public data 
such as public or industry reports to understand the institutional context of Tier-I suppliers. 
3.2. Data Analysis 
Based on NGO and industry materials, we created detailed descriptions of the institutional 
setting for the five different cases. As the first-tier suppliers operate in several different 
countries, we focused on the locations in which they source and process their products. We 
conducted open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) for the secondary information by grouping 
words, sentences and paragraphs into codes to aid with further analysis. Axial coding was 
then undertaken to eliminate and merge codes based on common themes. We proceeded by 
linking the codes to the theoretical constructs such as information asymmetry, information 
transparency and institutional decoupling. Details of the coding (developed based on Wilhelm 
et al., 2016) is presented in Table 1.  
<<Include Table 1 about here>> 
This data analysis process allowed us to identify the conditions that affect direct suppliers in 
coupling or decoupling in their double agency role. After initial analysis for each case, we 
conducted cross case analysis to identify any similarities and differences in the central 
constructs (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Wilhelm, et al. 2016). For selective disclosure, we 
compared the institutional context, corporate materials and NGO documents to identify if 
selective disclosure exists in the supply chains. Details of each institutional context is 
presented in Table 2. 
<<Include Table 2 about here>> 
4. Case Analysis 
This section presents the analysis of the individual cases and cross-case analysis to gain 
insights of the sustainable practices across the agri-food supply chains.  
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4.1. Within case analysis 
4.1.1. McDonald's 
McDonald's is a multinational food company that has thousands of Tier-I and Tier-II 
suppliers. For the purpose of this research, we consider issues around sustainable soy. 
McDonald’s was targeted by Greenpeace for sourcing chicken from Cargill, with the NGO 
accusing McDonald’s of promoting deforestation of the Amazon rainforest to grow soy used 
as poultry feed (Greenpeace, 2006). McDonald’s agreed to Greenpeace’s demand and set a 
target to procure fully sustainable certified soy by 2020 (Greenpeace, 2006). The fast food 
retailer also supported the ‘indefinite extension of the Brazilian Soy Moratorium’, along with 
Cargill and major soy traders where they agree not to purchase soy from Amazon forests 
deforested after 2006 (McDonald's, 2017a).  
Cargill is McDonald’s biggest supplier of poultry products in the UK and Europe (Cargill, 
n.d.). McDonald’s conducts supplier audits but mainly focuses on product quality 
(McDonald’s, 2017b) rather than environmental or social sustainability. Thus, there is little 
information about the Tier-I supplier’s sustainability, which shows information asymmetry 
between the buying firm and Tier-I supplier is high. 
McDonald’s had honoured Cargill with seven “Best of Sustainable Supply” awards (Cargill, 
2014). This indicates that lead firm pressure is low, as McDonald's views Cargill as having 
good environmental practices and recognises it as an important supplier. The regulatory 
pressure is also quite low since there is lack of monitoring and weak enforcement from the 
Brazilian government as seen from the Brazilian Forest Code and CAR (i.e. Soares-Filho et 
al., 2014). However, industry pressure for sustainability is quite high as seen by the 
establishment of the Soy Moratorium agreement, and Cargill’s support of the Moratorium 
(Cargill, 2015). 
There are strong incentives for Cargill to comply with the primary agency role because it is 
rewarded with continued and increased business through its sustainability efforts. This is 
demonstrated when McDonald’s France signed a new three-year agreement with Cargill in 
2016 to source additional poultry products (Cargill, 2016). Cargill shows evidence of 
coupling with its primary agency role in its collaboration with NGOs and industry initiatives. 
Cargill sources from more than 15,000 soy farmers, a mixture of small and large farmers 
(Cargill, 2017b). McDonald's relies heavily on certifications to monitor Tier-II suppliers. 
This means that information transparency between McDonald's and Tier-II suppliers is low 
     
9 
 
because they do not interact with each other. Cargill has little incentive to implement 
sustainability in Tier-II suppliers’ operations as the price of certified sustainable soy does not 
guarantee a premium for the company. Despite that, Cargill shows evidence of coupling with 
its secondary agency role in training 300 employees to monitor the Forest Code 
implementation and encourage farmers to register with CAR. It created a ‘Geographical 
Information System (GIS)’ team to monitor suppliers’ compliance with regulations and 
monitor their supply chains. Cargill requests farmers to provide evidence of their registration 
with CAR, and those who failed to do so were required to sign an agreement stating they will 
adhere to CAR deadlines (Cargill, 2017a). To date, Cargill assessed more than 12,000 
suppliers to track progress towards CAR status and Brazil Forest Code implementation. In 
summary, high industry pressure seems to be the main driver for Cargill’s coupling with its 
double agency role, but incentives increase the possibility of coupling with the primary 
agency role. 
Although deforestation due to soybean cultivation in the Amazon decreased due to the Soy 
Moratorium, the deforestation in Cerrado, Brazil, increased (Gibbs et al., 2015). According to 
a recent report, Cargill is one of the firms most closely linked to deforestation activity in the 
area (The Mighty Earth, 2017). Cargill’s website did not specify that the company sources 
from Cerrado. However, it took a reactive approach and refused to support the extension of 
Soy Moratorium from Amazon forests to Cerrado (The Mighty Earth, 2017). This indicates 
that Cargill seems to promote its positive efforts in Amazon forests but does not disclose 
information regarding any involvement in deforestation of lands in Cerrado, suggesting 
selective disclosure.  
4.1.2. Hershey 
Hershey is a major North America chocolate company that sources a large amount of cocoa. 
In 2012, it committed to purchasing 100% certified and sustainable cocoa by the year 2020. 
Although Hershey is yet to fully meet its sustainability targets, it is currently sourcing 60% 
certified sustainable cocoa, showing that it is in line for its 2020 target (The Hershey 
Company, 2017). Hershey implemented sustainability standards by using certifications and 
working with Tier-I suppliers, however the company has demonstrated a desire to move 
beyond relying solely on third-party certification and actively engaging with smallholders. 
This led to the creation of programs and partnerships with the aim of improving agriculture 
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practices, investment in education and community infrastructure. Ultimately, Hershey hopes 
to improve smallholder cocoa farmers’ standards of living (The Hershey Company, 2017).  
Hershey uses a mixture of third-party certifications and sustainability audits to verify Tier-I 
suppliers’ compliance. In 2013, it used external auditors to monitor and verify 25% of 
suppliers. This number increased to 50 percent by 2014. The buyer chose suppliers for audits 
based on its supplier spend (The Hershey Company, 2014). Hershey worked with ‘Source 
Trust’ to interact with Tier-II suppliers (The Hershey Company, 2017). These certifications 
benefit Hershey because they provide a minimum sustainability standard for its suppliers and 
traceability in the supply chain. Meanwhile, the certifications can also benefit farmers in 
terms of higher income, access to new markets and improvements to their local community. 
Barry Callebaut is one of Hershey’s primary suppliers of cocoa (Barry Callebaut, 2007). 
Barry Callebaut views sustainability as a core strategy for growth and invests in schemes that 
improve social and environmental sustainability. Approximately 72% of Barry Callebaut’s 
sales revenue comes from Europe and North America (Barry Callebaut, 2015). With growing 
awareness and demand for sustainable chocolates in these two regions (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2009), adopting sustainable practices for its cocoa supply 
chain allows the supplier to establish an order-winning criterion in the industry. Barry 
Callebaut operates in a low regulatory environment as most of the cocoa production and 
processing is based in West Africa, where there have traditionally been low regulatory labour 
and environmental pressures (Sackett, 2008). However, there are strong pressures in the 
cocoa industry due to low yields caused by extensive cultivation practices, an aging 
workforce, and the impact of pests and disease on crops (Wessell & Quist-Wessell, 2015). 
Hershey views Barry Callebaut as a strategic partner as demonstrated when it signed a 
contract to source additional cocoa from the company in 2011 (Barry Callebaut, 2011). In 
addition, the Tier-I supplier developed its own sustainability scheme before its partnership 
with Hershey. This indicates that lead firm pressure is low since Barry Callebaut has their 
own sustainability programme, which Hershey chose to join after they became partners in the 
supply chain. Both firms agreed to work together on research & development, and to create a 
sustainable cocoa supply chain (Barry Callebaut, 2011). This indicates that that information 
transparency is high as they have frequent sustainability interactions beyond audits.   
Barry Callebaut has a strong incentive to comply with its primary agency role because it 
views sustainability as a growth strategy. The Tier-I supplier seems to go beyond Hershey’s 
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sustainability standards and couples with its primary agency role. It invested in a wide range 
of sustainability activities and partnership with NGOs to promote sustainability across the 
cocoa industry. For instance, it established the ‘Forever Chocolate’ strategy with the aim of 
improving social and environmental issues (Barry Callebaut, 2016b). The company also 
collaborated with SAP to create a “cloud-based solution” to improve traceability and 
sustainability data management (Barry Callebaut, 2016a). 
The information transparency between Hershey and its Tier-II suppliers is high because it 
works with Tier-I suppliers and NGOs to interact with farmers through the “Learn to Grow” 
programme. Through this initiative, Hershey provides training to help farmers obtain UTZ 
certifications and distributes higher quality cocoa trees to certified farmers (The Hershey 
Company, 2017). As an incentive, farmers that achieve certification standards receive 
premium payments for their cocoa beans. Barry Callebaut’s incentives for complying with its 
secondary agency role is high because sustainable chocolates provide it with new market 
opportunities in the future and establish an order-winning criterion. Barry Callebaut seems to 
engage substantively in its secondary agency role. It works with International Cocoa 
Initiative to pilot a system to track and tackle child labour in its supply chain (Barry Callebaut, 
2017a). It also invests in female empowerment initiatives to help women improve their 
business skills and earn a living (Barry Callebaut, 2017b). Lastly, it works with the 
International Finance Corporation and The Sustainable Trade Initiative to provide finance to 
more than 100,000 smallholders with the aim of expanding their production and income 
(International Finance Corporation, 2016). To summarise, high industry pressure and high 
incentives from new market opportunities lead to the Tier-I supplier coupling with its double 
agency role in social sustainability. This is further enhanced by high levels of information 
transparency in the multi-tier supply chain. The analysis of NGO reports and articles show no 
signs of selective disclosure by Barry Callebaut. 
4.1.3. Nestlé 
Nestlé is a multinational food company with more than 10,000 Tier-I suppliers. It trained 
300,000 of its farmers in 2014 (Chartered Institute of Procurement & Supply, 2014), and 
established a set of ‘Responsible Sourcing Guidelines’ to increase transparency and 
traceability in its key raw ingredients’ supply chains. In 2010, Nestlé introduced 
sustainability targets into its business with the aim of removing deforestation in its supply 
chain (Nestlé, 2011). Nestlé aims to source 80% of the key ingredients from audited and 
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compliant Tier-I suppliers by 2020 (Nestlé, n.d.). At the same time, it aims to implement 
traceability to 80% of its key ingredients and ensure that 70% of them are sustainably sourced 
(Nestlé, n.d.).  
To meet its palm oil target, Nestlé works with Wilmar International, a major agribusiness 
group, who supplies most of its palm oil. Wilmar International is currently operating in South 
East Asia, where there is weak enforcement of social and environmental regulations with 
regards to palm oil (Ivancic & Koh, 2016). However, there is high industry pressure to 
implement sustainability in palm oil from NGOs and consumers (Greenpeace, 2008; Amnesty 
International, 2016). The level of information transparency between the buying firm and Tier-
I supplier is very high. Nestlé conducts audits on Wilmar’s supply chain and engaged with 
the supplier extensively in the aftermath of an Amnesty International (2016) report into 
labour abuses in Wilmar’s downstream supply chain (Nestlé, n.d.). Lead firm pressure for 
sustainability is strong, evidenced by Nestlé terminating Wilmar’s contract from 2010-2012 
because the supplier failed to comply with Nestlé’s sustainability standards (Amnesty 
International, 2016). The incentive for Wilmar to comply with a primary agency role is strong 
because complying with the lead firm’s sustainability requirements allows it to remain as one 
of Nestlé’s main palm oil suppliers. To comply with institutional pressure for sustainability, 
Wilmar set up a transparency dashboard to track its progress for sustainability (The Forest 
Trust, 2015). Within the dashboard, Wilmar has a grievance procedure where it reports on 
allegations from NGOs or consumers. In addition, it developed a ‘No Deforestation, No Peat, 
No Exploitation Policy’ to address environmental and social problems (Wilmar, 2013). 
Wilmar’s palm oil sustainability policies seem to reflect Nestlé’s responsible sourcing policy, 
as both companies’ policies go beyond RSPO standards to protect peatlands and high-carbon 
forests.  
Information transparency between the lead firm and Tier-II suppliers is high, as Nestlé works 
with ‘The Forest Trust’ to interact with farmers and provide them with support for social and 
environmental problems (Nestlé, n.d.). The incentive for Wilmar to comply with its 
secondary agency role is also strong, which is also driven by being able to maintain its 
supplier status.  
As a result, high agency factors lead to coupling with the secondary agency role. Wilmar 
partner with Wild Asia, GeoTraceability and the Sustainable Trade Initiative to develop ‘a 
traceability system for smallholders’ so that mills can track their smallholder supply base. 
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With the aim of encouraging farmers to participate in the programme, Wilmar included 
‘GeoTraceability’s Digital Agronomist’ into the system which allows farmers to benefit from 
tailored agronomist advice for their fields, which is further supported by training and leads to 
RSPO certifications (Wilmar, 2016a). Ultimately, smallholders can benefit from improved 
productivity and profitability in their supply chain. In April 2017, Wilmar announced that it 
would collaborate with Verité on a 12-month project to address social issues in its own and 
its sub-suppliers’ operations. For environmental sustainability issues, Wilmar aims to 
improve transparency by supporting the implementation of ‘Starling’, a tool developed by 
TFT, Airbus Defence and Spare and SarVision’ into its supply chain. Starling can help 
monitor the palm oil supplier’s ‘No deforestation’ policies by verifying their sustainability 
claims (Wilmar, 2016b). In summary, high incentives, high industry pressure, and high lead 
firm pressure leads to Wilmar coupling in a double agency role for both social and 
environmental sustainability. This is further enhanced by high information transparency 
between lead firm, Tier-I, and Tier-II suppliers. All these factors compensate for the lack of 
formal regulatory pressure on Wilmar’s business. Analysis into NGO reports show no signs 
of selective disclosure. Although there were allegations that the company had engaged in 
deforestation and instances of child labour were found on some of its plantations (Amnesty 
International, 2016), the company disclosed these problems on its website and outlined the 
actions it had taken to address them (Wilmar International, 2017). Wilmar did not attempt to 
hide negative information from stakeholders.  
4.2. Cross Case Analysis 
This section presents a cross-case analysis of the three cases discussed in the previous section 
to explore trends between cases pertaining to factors that influence Tier-I suppliers’ decisions 
to couple or decouple with a double agency role This study also explores the possibility of 
selective deflection existing even when suppliers choose to couple with their double agency 
role. The case analysis is summarised in Table 3 (table structure adopted from Wilhelm et al., 
2016). 
<<Include Table 3 about here>> 
4.2.1. Primary Agency Role 
All cases demonstrate coupling with their primary agency role. High incentives, high industry 
pressure and low regulatory pressure seem to be present in all of the cases. The soy case 
shows that coupling can exist despite low regulatory pressure and low information 
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transparency if there are high incentives and high industry pressure. This indicates that lead 
firms can incentivize Tier-I suppliers to comply with a primary agency role in the absence of 
regulatory pressure and information transparency. The cocoa case shows high transparency, 
high incentives, high industry pressure but low lead firm pressure and low regulatory pressure. 
Incentives seem to be a major driver for coupling of primary agency role, as Barry Callebaut 
views it as their growth strategy. This indicates that pressure from the lead firm might not be 
such a strong factor since industry pressure and high incentives can lead to coupling for 
primary agency role despite low pressure from the lead firm and low regulatory pressure. 
However, palm oil Tier-I suppliers experience high pressure from industry, high lead firm 
power, high incentives for implementing sustainability and high information transparency. 
This shows that the lead firm can use pressure as an incentive for Tier-I suppliers to couple in 
a primary agency role to protect its status as the lead firm’s supplier. High information 
transparency also leads to coupling for the primary agency role. 
4.2.2. Secondary Agency Role 
Although all cases show evidence of coupling in a secondary agency role, those with high 
information transparency at the secondary agency level, such as cocoa and palm oil, show 
that the Tier-I suppliers have more engagement with their double agency role where they 
invest in schemes that benefit the farming practices and standard of living in the communities 
in which they operate. Meanwhile, lack of transparency for soybeans at the secondary agency 
level shows low levels of coupling. Cargill only focuses on monitoring and ensuring farmers 
comply with government sustainability regulations without providing direct benefits to the 
farmers.  
4.2.3. Selective Disclosure 
There was evidence of selective disclosure in only one case. In the soy case, Cargill promoted 
sustainability in Amazon forests but made no commitment to addressing soy sustainability in 
other parts of Brazil. However, in the cocoa and palm oil cases, there was no evidence of 
selective disclosure. We provide possible reasoning for this in the following section. 
5. Discussion and Implications 
This study indicates that agency factors such as information transparency and incentives have 
a positive effect on Tier-I suppliers coupling in their double agency role. Incentives are 
effective in both agency roles, while the importance of information transparency between the 
lead firm and Tier-II supplier increases appears to increase Tier-I suppliers’ engagement in a 
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secondary agency role. This is understandable, as high information asymmetry can lead to 
suppliers’ opportunism, leading to the chain liability effect. On the other hand, when 
information asymmetry in the supply chain is low, lead firms are ‘closer’ to both their Tier-I 
and Tier-II suppliers. As such, there may be a greater expectation on Tier-I firms to engage in 
a secondary agency role, and more support and incentive provided by the lead firm to 
encourage them to do so. These results mirror those found by Wilhelm et al. (2016). 
Institutional factors, especially industry pressure, were found to have a positive effect on the 
double agency role for Tier-I suppliers. In all cases, it led to coupling with a double agency 
role. Further analysis of the soybean case shows coupling in the secondary agency role 
occurred only with high industry pressure, despite other factors remaining low. These 
findings suggest that industry pressure has a strong influence in affecting Tier-I suppliers in 
undertaking the double agency role. This supports findings of previous studies in which 
companies improved their sustainability standards due to industry pressures (Zadek, 2004; 
Terry, 1983). However, the soybean case also indicates that industry pressure alone may be 
insufficient as it may lead to selective disclosure. While industry pressure was high, lead firm 
pressure and information transparency were low. Under these conditions, selective disclosure 
occurred. Institutional pressure in isolation may increase the possibility of selective 
disclosure because Tier-I supplier want to portray an image that they are complying with 
institutional stakeholders’ demands without necessarily feeling pressure from the lead firm to 
make any substantive amendments to their practices. Moreover, in line with our reasoning in 
the previous paragraph, if information transparency is low, lead firms may not know what 
Tier-I and Tier-II suppliers are doing. As such, Tier-I suppliers may believe they can ‘get 
away’ with engaging in selective disclosure. In the other two cases, either lead firm pressure 
(in the palm oil case) or information transparency (in the palm oil and cocoa cases) were high, 
and selective disclosure did not occur. In the palm oil case, Nestlé representatives visited its 
Tier-I supplier relating to its sustainability activities, and Tier-II suppliers to understand their 
living conditions. Such activities can reduce the possibility of selective disclosure as they 
make it difficult for Tier-I suppliers to conceal information about sustainability when the lead 
firm has a good understanding of the sustainable issues at the Tier-II level. This seems logical 
because Tier-I suppliers (agents) are more likely to engage in opportunistic behaviours when 
information asymmetry (Eisenhardt, 1988) exists in the supply chain. Moreover, incentives 
are also important factors in encouraging Tier-I suppliers to engage in a secondary agency 
role, as shown in the cocoa and palm oil cases. This supports the findings of Grimm and 
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colleagues (2014), who demonstrated evidence of Tier-I suppliers coupling with a secondary 
agency role if they could benefit from doing so.  
In line with prior research (Gold et al., 2013), this study shows that companies collaborating 
with NGOs to address issues in the supply chain can lead to higher information transparency 
and a higher possibility of Tier-I suppliers coupling with their secondary agency role. As 
companies may lack the resources or expertise in sustainability, NGOs can be a source of 
knowledge and provide them with guidance to improve sustainability. For example, Nestlé 
worked with TFT to gain visibility into its Tier-II suppliers’ practices, assess their capability 
about sustainable issues and provide them with advice to improve their practices. Similarly, 
Hershey worked with ‘Source Trust’ to deliver their ‘Learn to Grow’ programme with the 
aim of gaining visibility into farmers’ sustainable practices and help farmers improve their 
farming practices through training. Both cases show that collaborating with NGO leads to 
higher information transparency in sub-suppliers’ sustainable practices, which can increase 
the chance of Tier-I suppliers coupling in their secondary agency role. Overall findings are 
presented in the framework displayed in Figure 1.  
Our findings have several important implications for practitioners. Firstly, firms should invest 
in incentives to stimulate Tier-I suppliers. Appealing to their motivation such as rewarding 
them with additional business and paying a premium for sustainable products when they 
achieve specific sustainability targets. This also means that lead firms need to be able to work 
and interact with their Tier-I suppliers to gain visibility in their sustainability practices. In 
doing so, the lead firm will be able to measure and quantify direct suppliers’ sustainability 
efforts and reward them accordingly. This can incentivise suppliers to engage in 
sustainability practices and keep suppliers tied to the lead firm.  
Secondly, it is important for the lead firm to gain transparency into Tier-II suppliers’ 
sustainability activities to understand sustainability issues and constraints faced by sub-
suppliers. This can be done by investment in sustainability schemes and collaboration with 
NGOs. By improving transparency, this can reduce the likelihood of Tier-I suppliers 
decoupling with their secondary agency role by encouraging cross-tier collaboration.   
Thirdly, it is important for lead firms to understand that selective disclosure can exist despite 
Tier-I suppliers coupling with their double agency role. Firms should try to improve visibility 
in the supply chain and understand sustainability issues at the Tier-II level and generate a 
deep understanding of sustainability issues within the specific industry. If the lead firm finds 
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a discrepancy between expected and actual standards, it should communicate with Tier-I 
suppliers to find out if they are doing anything to address those discrepancies. However, this 
can be expensive and time-consuming as it requires a deep level of industry knowledge and 
insight into Tier-I suppliers’ sustainability practices.  
 
6. Conclusion and Scope for Future Research 
As sustainability in multi-tier supply chain becomes more important, Tier-I suppliers’ role in 
disseminating lead firms’ sustainability standards increased in popularity. This study built on 
existing literature regarding the conditions that influence Tier-I suppliers to couple with their 
double agency role with the aim of creating a transparent food supply chain and protecting 
lead firms from chain liability effects. Although this study highlights the possible existence of 
selective disclosure, future research into this phenomenon from Tier-I suppliers’ perspectives 
would be beneficial. Specifically, investigating why Tier-I suppliers engage in selective 
disclosure despite coupling in a double agency role would help protect against chain liability 
effects. Further, from an institutional perspective, in-depth analysis of how agri-food 
Figure 1 Framework  
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certification bodies such as the RSPO and UTZ operate with regards to influencing 
compliance to sustainability standards in the supply chain is important. As is the examination 
of how their operations could be improved. 
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Details of Coding Categories 
Coding Category Description 
Regulatory pressures for sustainability Examples when documents discuss external pressures 
arising from regulation. 
Industry Pressure for sustainability Instances when documents talk about industry pressure 
for sustainability from consumers and other stakeholders  
T1 suppliers’ incentives for 
implementing sustainability in primary 
and secondary role  
Documents that discuss access to new opportunities, 
improved profitability, competitiveness, reputational 
image or any additional advantages that arise from the 
implementation of sustainability standards in T1/T2 
operations 
Collaboration with NGO Instances when lead firm talk about their collaboration 
with NGOs 
Lead firm pressure for sustainability Instances when internal and external sources discuss lead 
firm purchasing powers, reliance on resources from 
suppliers and suppliers’ reputation.  
Information transparency buyer-T1 and  
Information transparency between buyer 
and T2 
Instances when buyer discusses information transparency 
in T1/T2 suppliers’ supply chains  
Coupling of primary/secondary agency 
role 
Examples when T1 makes actual changes to their 
sustainability practices, such as surpassing sustainability 
certification requirements or having dedicated roles to 
manage sustainability.  
Decoupling of primary/secondary agency 
role 
Instances when T1 only makes cosmetic changes in their 
sustainability management with the aim of passing audit 
before reverting to old practices after passing 
sustainability audits.  
 
Evidence of selective disclosure. Analysis of external stakeholders’ material indicates that 
Tier-I suppliers have engaged in some form of 
greenwashing activity (i.e. committed to a sustainable 
initiative without following through). 
No evidence of selective disclosure. Analysis of external stakeholders’ material shows no 
indication that Tier-I suppliers have engaged in 
greenwashing activity. 






Case Studies Characteristics of Institutional Context Secondary Data 
Soy (Brazil) Brazil’s forest code’s purpose is to regulate land use and protect environmentally sensitive areas. They are 
seen as insufficient to protect forests from deforestation due to problems with monitoring, enforcement and 
state reluctant to prosecute due to corruption practices. Due to growing pressure from NGOs and consumers, 
two major soybean associations signed an agreement stating that their members would not purchase soybeans 
sourced from deforested Amazon farmlands after 24 June 2006. In addition, there are also pressures from the 
consumer countries such as IDH programmes partly funding by the Dutch, Swiss and Danish governments as 
well as private companies. They aim to help soy producers in major soy exporting countries to comply with 
RTRS. External stakeholders such as banks and NGOs also play an important role in implementing 
sustainability. Banks have the power to control lending to agriculture businesses and refusal to comply with 
environmental regulation can lead to problems with financing. Meanwhile, refusal to comply with 
sustainability standards can also lead to reputational damage.  
 








Palm oil production mostly takes place in developing countries in South East Asia There is a lack of 
regulations which govern labour practices in these countries. Palm oil plantations are labour intensive, and 
most workers face a lack of job security. There is also evidence of child labour in the plantations as workers 
are pay is target-based, causing them to bring their children to work. As a result, children may drop out of 
school or skip class to help their parents in the plantation, which can lead to a poverty cycle. Regarding 
environmental conditions, palm oil contributes to rapid deforestation, reduction in biodiversity and more 
greenhouse gases. These issues led to the establishment of Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and 
Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) standards. Although ISPO is mandatory in Indonesia, their social and 
environmental standards are less strict compared to RSPO. However, there are criticisms that RSPO is not 
effective at addressing environmental issues and problems with the auditing process. Despite these factors, the 
industry pressure is quite strong because of pressure from consumers, NGOs and stakeholders. 
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Case Studies Characteristics of Institutional Context Secondary Data 
Cocoa (West 
Africa) 
The production and processing of cocoa mainly takes place in West Africa. The cocoa farmers are generally 
smallholders with limited power to influence lead firms. There is a lack of regulations regarding cocoa 
production and imports, this leads to problems with child labour and farmers being exploited by buyers.  
In addition, farmers receive low income and standards of livings. As a result, younger generations are more 
likely to choose an alternative career than become a cocoa farmer. Cocoa is generally certified by Rainforest 
Alliance, UTZ and fair trade. Fair trade focus on paying farmers with a fair price and premium for their 
products, while Rainforest Alliance focus on environmental issues with little premium and UTZ focus on both 
but with slightly less rigorous standards for both standards. 
(Anti-Slavery 
International, 












Commodity Institutional Factors Primary Agency Factors T1 compliance with 
primary agency role 
Secondary Agency Factors T1 compliance with 
secondary agency role 
Soybeans Low regulative 









from lead firm, as 
McDonald’s 
views Cargill as 
having good 
environmental 




Asymmetry from lead 
firm to T1 
Interaction between 
lead firm and supplier 
focuses on quality 
audits 
Incentive for T1 for 
primary agency role 
Continued and 
improve business 
from lead firm 
Couple 





from lead firm to T2 
No Interaction with T2 
suppliers 
Incentive for T1 for 
secondary agency role 
No guaranteed premium 







to register with 
CAR  
Assessed more than 
12,000 soy farmers 
for their compliance 
with CAR status and 
Brazil Forest Code 
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Cocoa Low regulatory 
pressure since 











not wanting to be 
cocoa farmers 
Low pressure 







Asymmetry from lead 
firm to T1 
Frequent interaction 
between lead firm and 
T1 
Incentive for T1 for 
primary agency role 
View sustainability as 





with the aim to 












from lead firm to T2 
Works with three 
established certification 
partners 
Interaction with T2 about 
sustainability issues and 
provide them with 
support to improve their 
standard of living 
Incentive for T1 for 
secondary agency role 
New market 
opportunities 
Order winning criteria 
Coupled 
They work with 
International Cocoa 
Initiative to tackle 
child labour.  
Help woman 
improve their 
business skills and 
earn a living by 





and The Sustainable 
Trade Initiative to 
provide finance to 
more than 100,000 
smallholder farmers 
Work with Hershey 
on the “Learn to 
Grow”” programme 
to help improve 
farming practices 
and help farmers 
become UTZ 
certified 
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Palm Oil Low regulatory 









from lead firm as 
Nestlé is one of 
their main 
customers and 
they have the 




Asymmetry from lead 
firm to T1 
Monthly meetings for 
social issues and 
audits 
Incentive for T1 for 
primary agency role 
Helps them retain 
their supplier status 
Coupled 
Wilmar set up their 
own sustainable 
policy, which goes 
beyond RSPO 
requirements and 
cover some of lead 
firm’s ‘Sustainable 
Sourcing policy’. 
Set up transparency 
dashboard for 
sustainable practices  
Information Asymmetry 
from lead firm to T2 
High visibility into T2 
they work with TFT to 
interact with T2 farmers 
Incentive for T1 for 
secondary agency role 








NGO to address 
social issues in their 
supply chain.  
Support the 
implementation of 
‘Starling’ to help 
verify 
environmental 
sustainable progress 
 
 
